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Abuse of Power: Immigration 
Courts and The Attorney 
General’s Referral Power 
Julie Menke1 
Abstract 
In June 2018, then Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued Matter 
of A-B-. This decision vacated the holding of the 2014 Board of 
Immigration Appeals decision, Matter of A-R-C-G-. In A-R-C-G-, the 
adjudicator held that, depending on the specific facts of the case, 
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 
relationship” constitutes a particular social group. Membership in a 
particular social group is one of five ways to qualify for asylum in the 
United States. Membership is based on a fact specific analysis 
conducted by an immigration adjudicator. Sessions’s decision to vacate 
Matter of A-R-C-G- had a devastating impact on the viability of asylum 
claims for individuals fleeing domestic violence.  
Matter of A-B- is just one of many instances where the Attorney 
General has overruled the prior holding of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals. Immigration courts are housed under the Department of 
Justice, and as head of the Department, the Attorney General can 
exercise control over the immigration courts. Under federal regulation, 
the Attorney General may direct an immigration decision from the 
Board of Immigration Appeals to themself for review. The referral 
power then allows the Attorney General to either affirm or overrule 
decisions from the Board of Immigration Appeals. 
Sessions’s decision in Matter of A-B- is illustrative of the issues 
with the Attorney General’s referral power. As a political appointee, 
the Attorney General can refer any case to himself or herself at their 
discretion and overturn years of precedent. In doing so, the Attorney 
General interferes with the case-by-case adjudications by the 
immigration courts. This delegation of power by Congress infringes on 
the principle of separation of powers, as set out in the Constitution. It 
is unwise to let a political authority hold so much power over 
immigration decisions and intrude on the independence of the 
immigration system. Decisions like Matter of A-B- illustrate how the 
referral power can be easily abused and manipulated, and why limits 
need to be placed on the Attorney General’s referral power. 
 
 
1. Julie Menke is a J.D. candidate at Case Western Reserve University 
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Introduction 
On December 25, 2005, a mother and her three children entered the 
United States without inspection.2 Along with more than 50,000 others 
that year,3 her purpose in entering was to seek asylum in the United 
States.4 She was a longtime victim of domestic violence in Guatemala—
her husband abused her weekly.5 He broke her nose.6 He burned her 
after throwing paint thinner on her.7 He raped her.8 After calling the 
police several times for help, the officers told her they were unwilling 
 
2. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014). 
3. 2005 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 39, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY (Nov. 2006), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Yearbook_Immigr
ation_Statistics_2005.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NNH-6NQH]. 
4. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
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to interfere in her marital relationship.9 Her attempts to leave the 
relationship by running away to other cities and family’s houses were 
unsuccessful and resulted in death threats from her husband.10 
After applying for asylum in the United States, an immigration 
judge ruled the woman, referred to as “C-G-,” did not demonstrate 
sufficient past persecution on account of her particular social group: 
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their 
relationship.”11 This meant she did not qualify for asylum.12 C-G- 
appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), 
which acts as a governing body that oversees immigration judges’ 
decisions.13 After reviewing C-G-’s case, the BIA held in Matter of A-
R-C-G- that, depending on the facts of the specific case, “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” could 
constitute a particular social group as a basis for asylum in the United 
States.14 This was the first published precedential decision affirming the 
validity of a particular social group of domestic violence victims.15 
Membership in a particular social group is one of five ways to 
qualify for asylum in the United States.16 Based on the definition of a 
refugee,17 an immigrant qualifies for asylum if they can prove that they 
have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of: race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.18 Membership in a particular social group is based on a shared 
characteristic that is either “so fundamental to individual identity or 
conscience” that the individual should not be required to change, or is 
a characteristic they cannot change.19 It must be an “immutable 
 
9. Id. 
10. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 389. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 390. 
13. Id.  
14. Id. at 388. 
15. Board of Immigration Appeals Holds that Guatemalan Woman Fleeing 
Domestic Violence Meets Threshold Asylum Requirement, 128 Hᴀʀᴠ. L. 
Rᴇᴠ. 2090, 2093 (2015). 
16. Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum 
[https://perma.cc/V4SY-MYK5]. 
17. Refugees and Asylees, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/refugees-asylees 
[https://perma.cc/YVG9-LF8W]. 
18. Qualifying for Asylum, POLITICAL ASYLUM USA, 
https://www.politicalasylumusa.com/application-for-asylum/ 
[https://perma.cc/59B5-Y9PN].  
19. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). 
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characteristic” that is visible to society and particularly defined as a 
discrete class of persons.20 This ultimately leads to underlying factual 
questions of the group and the society in question to determine the legal 
question of a “cognizable particular social group.”21 
Just four years after the BIA’s decision in Matter of A-R-C-G, then-
Attorney General Jeff Sessions overruled the holding.22 In Matter of A-
B-, Sessions held that the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G- improperly 
applied precedent from other BIA rulings and did not properly consider 
whether C-G-’s persecution was on account of her membership in a 
particular social group.23 His ruling effectively limited the availability 
of asylum to victims of domestic violence.24 
Sessions’s authority to overrule BIA decisions and precedent derives 
from a federal regulation that permits the Attorney General to review 
BIA decisions.25 Under the regulation, the Attorney General may refer 
a BIA decision to themself for certification.26 The BIA or Secretary of 
Homeland Security may also refer a case to the Attorney General for 
certification.27 This referral power allows the Attorney General to either 
affirm or overrule immigration decisions acting under his authority as 
head of the immigration courts, which are housed exclusively under the 
Department of Justice.28 While a decision from the BIA is appealable 
 
20. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014). 
21. See id. at 227.   
22. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
23. Id. at 319–20.   
24. Id. at 320 (“Generally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence or 
gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for 
asylum.”); Stuart Anderson, The Sessions Asylum Decision: What Are 
Its Implications?, FORBES (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2018/06/13/the-sessions-
asylum-decision-what-are-its-implications/#81a1673776bb 
[https://perma.cc/RX3J-D8VG]. 
25. Organization, Jurisdiction, and Powers of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1) (2019). 
26. 8 C.F.R. §§1003.1(h)(1)(i). 
27. 8 C.F.R. §§1003.1(h)(1)(ii)-(iii) (“The Board shall refer to the Attorney 
General for review of its decision all cases that . . . the Chairman or a 
majority of the Board believes should be referred to the Attorney General 
for review . . . [or] The Secretary of Homeland Security, or specific officials 
of the Department of Homeland Security designated by the Secretary with 
the concurrence of the Attorney General, refers to the Attorney General 
for review.”). 
28. Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch 
Immigration Policy Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 
101 Iᴏᴡᴀ L. Rᴇᴠ. 841, 846–47 (2016); David Leopold, Five Chilling Ways 
Senator Jeff Sessions Could Attack Immigrants as Attorney General, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2017), 
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to the federal courts, the adjudication process is reshaped when the 
Attorney General co-ops a case from the BIA and puts themself 
between the immigration and the federal courts.29  
In this Note, I argue that the power given to the Attorney General 
to refer cases to themself is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial 
power which infringes on the separation of powers set out in the 
Constitution. Such a high-ranking political appointee should not be 
involved in a legal analysis that rests on the interpretation and 
application of a Congressional standard. I further argue that even if a 
court is unlikely to rule this power unconstitutional, it is still unwise to 
let a political authority hold so much power over immigration decisions 
and intrude on the independence of the immigration courts. Decisions 
like Matter of A-B- illustrate how the referral power can be easily 
abused and manipulated, and why limits need to be placed on the 
Attorney General’s referral power. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the immigration 
system and the role of each of the three branches of the federal 
government in this system. 
Part II discusses the Attorney General’s referral authority and 
where the authority to hold such control over immigration decisions 
comes from. It further analyzes how this power has been used in the 
past. 
In Part III, I argue that the referral authority improperly allows 
the Attorney General to interfere in the impartial immigration judge’s 
decision-making. Intervening in a case-specific adjudication is a judicial 
function, not a legislative or executive function.30 Overstepping the 
independent setup of the immigration judges and assuming the 
jurisdiction of an Article III court is an unconstitutional interpretation 
of the executive’s immigration power. 
In Part IV of this note, I supplement this argument to explain that 
even if a court would uphold the Attorney General’s referral authority 
under the Constitution, it is still unwise to let a political appointee hold 
such power over immigration decisions. 
Finally, in Part V, I conclude that this power needs to be limited 
in order to prevent further abuse. I propose first that Congress should 
restrict the Attorney General from referring a case to themself for 
review on their own initiative. This restriction would allow the 
 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/five-chilling-ways-senator-jeff-
sessions-could-attack-immigrants-as-attorney-
general_us_5870022ce4b099cdb0fd2ef7 [https://perma.cc/F7FX-JSDJ]. 
29. Fatma Marouf, How Immigration Courts Work, THE CONVERSATION 
(June 25, 2018, 6:36 AM) http://theconversation.com/how-immigration-
court-works-98678 [https://perma.cc/C33L-M9L5]. 
30. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) 
(2013). 
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Attorney General to review a decision only when the BIA or the 
Department of Homeland Security requests review. Another solution is 
to limit the Attorney General’s standard of review to equal that of the 
BIA. 
Part I: Structure of the Immigration System 
Each branch of the federal government plays an important role in 
the immigration system.31 Under Article I of the United States 
Constitution, the legislative branch has the power “[to] establish a 
uniform Rule of Naturalization.”32 From this grant of power, Congress 
has distributed immigration roles and powers amongst each branch of 
the federal government.33 The goal was to create an immigration system 
that is favorable to desired immigrants, such as workers, families and 
refugees, while simultaneously facilitating the removal of undesirable 
immigrants, such as those posing national security risks, public charges, 
or criminals.34  
A. The Legislative Branch 
Congress has the power to create legislation that is the foundation 
of U.S. immigration law.35 The modern foundation of immigration law 
is the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”).36 This 
legislation revised earlier immigration statutes and created 
comprehensive immigration law.37 In addition to passing legislation, 
Congress holds oversight hearings that review the internal workings of 
executive immigration agencies.38 This oversight is intended to check 
the executive branch and ensure the executive is properly enforcing the 
immigration legislation as Congress prescribed.39 
 
31. See Megan Davy et al., Who Does What in U.S. Immigration, MIGRATION 
POLICY INST.  (Dec. 5, 2005), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/who-does-what-us-immigration 
[https://perma.cc/9NFM-MMS5].    
32. U.S. Cᴏɴsᴛ. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
33. See MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43226, AN 
OVERVIEW OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION MATTERS 1 (2013) 
(describing the history of Congress’s distribution of power among the 
other two branches).  
34. Id. 
35. DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND 
PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 127 (6th ed. 2011). 
36. Id. at 128.  
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 127. 
39. Id. at 135-136.  
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B. The Judicial Branch 
The judicial branch has very limited participation in the review of 
immigration laws and decisions.40 The federal courts have upheld, on 
numerous occasions, the plenary powers of the political branches of 
government in determining immigration policy and laws.41 They have 
cited numerous reasons for their hands-off approach, including the 
political question doctrine, lack of capacity in the courts to hear more 
cases, and uniformity.42 The judicial branch therefore leaves the 
legislative and executive branches to determine the majority of 
immigration law. Congress has, however, reserved the availability of 
judicial review for constitutional claims and questions of law in 
immigration cases.43 In addition, the level of judicial review depends on 
the interests involved.44 Of the approximately 300,000 immigration 
cases heard each year in the immigration courts, only around two 
percent are appealed to the federal courts.45 Of that two percent, on 
average the federal courts agree to hear a mere eight percent.46 Such 
limited partition by the judicial branch in immigration matters leaves 
significantly more responsibility to the executive branch.  
C. The Executive Branch 
As with other areas of law, the executive branch is charged with 
enforcing the immigration laws Congress creates.47 Congress, through 
statutes, determines what class of non-citizens will or will not be denied 
admission and removed from the United States.48 The executive 
enforces these statutes and determines who falls into each class based 
on Congress’s guidance.49 The executive cannot exceed the bounds of 
Congress’s statutes.50 Congress, however, has traditionally given the 
executive broad powers in creating immigration procedures to enforce 
 
40. Id. at 97. 
41. Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration 
Policy, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES (Feb. 25, 2009), 
https://cis.org/Report/Plenary-Power-Should-Judges-Control-US-
Immigration-Policy#2 [https://perma.cc/5GVR-3GPK]. 
42. Id. 
43. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D) (2013). 
44. LEE, supra note 33, at 1.  
45. Marouf, supra note 29. 
46. Id.  
47. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 106–07. 
48. Id. at 107.  
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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the laws.51 The executive therefore has extensive latitude to structure 
its enforcement procedures however it sees fit. 
There are six major executive agencies charged with enforcing 
immigration laws: the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Department of State, the Department of Justice, the Department of 
Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Social 
Security Administration.52 Congress transferred many of the 
immigration functions originally delegated to the Attorney General to 
the Secretary of Homeland Security after the department’s creation in 
2002.53 This department is now principally charged with enforcing and 
administering immigration and citizenship benefits.54 Up until the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Justice was responsible for the majority of immigration functions.55 
After the creation of this additional department, the Department of 
Justice has been charged with interpreting and administering federal 
immigration laws.56 The Department of State handles most immigration 
petitions applied for outside of the United States.57 The Department of 
Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Social 
Security Administration all play minor roles in enforcing immigration 
laws.58 Collectively, these six agencies work together to enforce the 
immigration laws created by Congress.  
Part II: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REFERRAL 
AUTHORITY 
Immigration courts are housed exclusively under the Department 
of Justice.59 The Executive Office for Immigration Review includes all 
immigration courts as well as the BIA.60 Immigration courts are made 
up of immigration judges—attorneys appointed by the Attorney 
 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 109.  
53. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 109. See Immigration and 
Nationality Act § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a). 
54. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 109–10. 
55. Id. at 118.  
56. Id. at 119. See also Homeland Security Act § 1101, 6 U.S.C. § 521 (2012). 
57. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 115. 
58. See id. at 123–26 (describing the roles different departments and 
administrations play in enforcing immigration laws). 
59. Leopold, supra note 28. 
60. Id.  
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General to serve as adjudicators in immigration proceedings.61 Unlike 
Article III judges under the judicial branch, immigration judges serve 
as adjudicators for the executive branch.62 They are unlike 
administrative law judges in other executive agencies, which are 
certified, appointed, and supervised by independent agencies under the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.63 Administrative law judges are 
afforded decisional independence protections under the Administrative 
Procedure Act to ensure impartial and fair proceedings.64 They are not 
monitored or rewarded by the agencies they act under, and therefore 
are not beholden to the interests of those agencies.65 Immigration judges 
are not appointed under the Administrative Procedure Act, but instead 
by the Attorney General to act as their delegates in immigration cases.66 
If the decision of an immigration judge is appealed, it generally goes 
to the BIA for review.67 The BIA consists of twenty-one appointed 
immigration judges68 that review lower immigration judges’ decisions.69 
The Attorney General, as head of the Department of Justice, oversees 
these immigration courts and the “judges” within each court.70 These 
judges, as individual employees of the United States Department of 
Justice, act as the Attorney General’s agents and rule on immigration 
cases.71 
 
61. Immigration Judge, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., 
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/ [https://perma.cc/W868-78VJ] 
(click the “Immigration Judge” hyperlink). 
62. See id.; Judicial Oversight v. Judicial Independence, TRAC IMMIGRATION, 
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/194/include/side_4.html 
[https://perma.cc/9K2K-WDFE] (“Unlike a United States District Court 
judge, an immigration judge’s authority is not derived from Article III of 
the Constitution, which establishes the Judicial Branch. Article III grants 
United States District Court judges, United States Appellate Court judges 
and United States Supreme Court judges the highest degree of judicial 
independence — their appointments are made for life-tenure and must be 
confirmed by the U.S. Senate.”). 
63. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).  
64. See 5 U.S.C. § 557. 
65. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION, AND 
INTERPRETATION 761(2014). 
66. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(a).  
67. Board of Immigration Appeals, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals 
[perma.cc/S56J-775B]. 
68. Id.  
69. Leopold, supra note 28.  
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g) (2012). 
71. Leopold, supra note 28. 
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In addition to their power over immigration judges, the Attorney 
General also has the power to unilaterally overrule precedent decisions 
of the BIA.72 The Attorney General may review a decision from the 
BIA under three circumstances.73 The Attorney General may refer a 
case to themself, or may review a case at the request of the BIA or the 
Secretary of Homeland Security.74 In reviewing a BIA decision, the 
Attorney General may either affirm the decision or vacate it and issue 
their decision in place of the BIA’s.75 
The Attorney General receives this referral power from federal 
regulation, in accordance with the broad immigration powers Congress 
delegated to the executive branch.76 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) states that 
the Attorney General shall “review such administrative determinations 
in immigrations proceeding . . . as the Attorney General determines to 
be necessary.”77 This delegation of power allows the Attorney General 
to review BIA decisions when seen fit, even if neither the BIA nor the 
Secretary of Homeland Security requests review.78 While this power is 
not exercised often,79 its effect substantially impacts a wide variety of 
immigration cases.80 
Unlike decisions by the BIA, which are confined to de novo review 
of questions of law and clearly erroneous review of facts, the Attorney 
General has de novo review of all aspects of the BIA’s decisions.81 They 
are not confined to reviewing legal or factual errors.82 They additionally 
are not bound by precedent from the immigration courts regarding law 
or fact in the underlying proceedings. 83  
Under the INA, “determination and ruling by the Attorney General 
with respect to all questions of law shall be controlling.”84 A referral 
decision by the Attorney General therefore is binding on the 
 
72. 8 C.F.R. §§1003.1(h)(1)(i)-(iii). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Feere, supra note 40. 
76. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 123–26. 
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2009). 
78. 8 C.F.R. §§1003.1(h)(1)(i)–(iii). 
79. Laura Trice, Adjudication By Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards 
In Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1771 (2010) (the Attorney General averaged 
“only about 1.7 certified decisions annually between 1999 and 2009”). 
80. Id.  
81. Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 913 (A.G. 2006). 
82. Id.  
83. Gonzales, supra note 28, at 856. 
84. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2009). 
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government and the parties and overrules any inconsistent prior BIA 
precedent.85 Judicial review is available under certain circumstances for 
the Attorney General’s decisions.86 Upon review, an Attorney General’s 
decision is entitled to deference consistent with the Chevron framework. 
87 
The Attorney General may elect to refer a BIA case to themself 
that contains issues immigration courts are struggling to uphold 
consistently.88 The Attorney General may also choose to strategically 
select cases for review to advance the presidential administration’s 
immigration agenda.89 Because the Attorney General’s decision is 
binding throughout the immigration courts, they courts must follow 
any clarification or new standard the Attorney General establishes.90 
Any prior BIA rulings inconsistent with the Attorney General’s decision 
are then overruled. 91 
Part III: Constitutionality of The Attorney General’s 
Referral Decisions 
The delegation of self-referral power to the Attorney General allows 
them to review BIA decisions when seen fit.92 Intervening in a case 
specific adjudication, however, is a judicial, not legislative or executive, 
function.93 The Attorney General overstepping the independent setup 
of the immigration judges—and assuming the role of an Article III 
court—is an unconstitutional interpretation of the executive’s 
 
85. Gonzales, supra note 28, at 856. 
86. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK, 1625 (15th 
ed. 2016). 
87. Gonzales, supra note 28, at 857; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (establishing that the framework for judicial 
review of executive interpretation of administrative rules is a two-part 
test deciding whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue,” and if it has, whether the intent of Congress is clear or 
the agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute). 
88. Gonzales, supra note 28, at 842. 
89. Id. at 920. 
90. See David A. Martin, Improving the Exercise of the Attorney General’s 
Immigration Referral Power: Lessons from the Battle over the 
“Categorical Approach” to Classifying Crimes, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1, 11 
(2016). 
91. Gonzales, supra note 28, at 841. 
92. Id. at 842. 
93. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 
1252(a)(2)(D) (2005). 
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immigration power.94 In reviewing immigration decisions, Article III 
courts should therefore not give Chevron deference to such improper 
decisions by the Attorney General. 
A. Delegation, Deference and the Attorney General’s Referral Power 
The Constitution granted Congress the authority to create 
immigration law.95 Through various laws and acts, Congress has 
delegated certain legislative powers to the executive branch to develop 
immigration law.96 This raises the question of how much power 
Congress has the authority to delegate. The non-delegation doctrine 
concerns the relationship between Congress’s legislative powers and 
administrative agencies taking on those powers.97 The doctrine, in 
essence, prohibits Congress from delegating its legislative powers to the 
executive branch.98 The Supreme Court, however, held in J.W. 
Hampton v. United States that Congress can delegate quasi-legislative 
powers to an executive agency.99 This is conditioned on Congress giving 
the agency an “intelligible principle” to base their regulations on.100 
This intelligible principle is a general provision that allows the agency 
to fill in the details and conform to Congress’s intent.101 
The Supreme Court has further developed the law controlling how 
Congress may delegate quasi-legislative authority, how the executive 
may use that authority, and how courts should review such 
delegation.102 In the 1984 landmark case Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court established the Chevron 
doctrine.103 It set forth a two-part legal test for judicial review, where 
courts must defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous 
statutory provisions.104 The court must first determine if Congress 
 
94. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
95. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 4. 
96. WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 35, at 106-07.  
97. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (“The 
nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers 
that underlies our tripartite system of Government.”). 
98. See Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 
361 (2017).  
99. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). 
100. See id. 
101. See id. at 406.  
102. See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629. 
103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
104. Id. at 842-44. 
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implicitly delegated authority to the executive to interpret a statute.105 
If the court finds Congress has delegated authority, it must next 
determine whether the executive’s interpretation of the statute is 
reasonable.106 To determine reasonableness, the court must analyze 
whether the agency’s action was based on a permissible construction of 
the statute, even if the court would interpret the statute otherwise.107 
The Supreme Court has held that Chevron deference applies in the 
immigration context.108 It has additionally noted that judicial deference 
to the executive branch in immigration proceedings is particularly 
important.109 It has further held that the BIA, vested with the Attorney 
General’s discretion and authority, should be accorded Chevron 
deference “when it gives ambiguous statutory terms meaning through 
a process of case-by-case adjudication.”110 
Judicial review is available for questions of law regarding BIA or 
Attorney General decisions.111 An Article III court must defer to a 
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous immigration statute.112 In the 
context of immigration, this statute refers to Congress’s delegation of 
immigration authority to the executive branch through the INA.113 If 
the court finds the INA to be unambiguous and the executive’s 
interpretation in contradiction with the statute, the court will enforce 
Congress’s clear intent as expressed in the statute and disregard the 
executive’s interpretation.114 Additionally, if the executive’s 
interpretation of the statute is not reasonable, courts are not required 
to give it Chevron deference.115 In the immigration context, if the BIA 
or Attorney General depart from or change their interpretation of the 
 
105. Id. at 844. 
106. Id. at 843-44. 
107. Id. at 433. 
108. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999). 
109. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988). 
110. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448 (1987); INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424 (recognizing the BIA’s role and explaining that 
its case-by-case law-making adjudications deserve Chevron-style 
deference). 
111. See Stephen Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts; 
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEXAS L. REV. 1615 (2000). 
112. Jill Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law Adversaries, 
32 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 99, 116 (2018). 
113. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012). 
114. Family, supra note 112.  
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
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INA, the new interpretation may be entitled to deference if supported 
by a principled reason and explanation for the change.116 
Another factor of judicial review in immigration cases arises when 
a federal court interprets a statute and the Attorney General or BIA 
later interprets the statute in a different manner from the courts.117 The 
Supreme Court’s holding in Brand X requires courts to defer to an 
executive agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute, overruling the 
court’s prior interpretation.118 Courts have held that this applies to BIA 
and Attorney General decisions just as with other executive agency 
decisions.119 A BIA or Attorney General decision in conflict with a 
court’s interpretation then applies prospectively, not retroactively to 
immigration decisions.120 
B. Unconstitutional Delegation of Power to the Attorney General 
The Attorney General’s self-referral power calls into question 
whether the Attorney General can interfere in the immigration court’s 
impartial adjudication—a judicial, not executive, function. The 
Constitution does not permit an executive official to intervene in the 
adjudication process by a neutral decision-maker and turn legal 
interpretative decisions into political decisions.121 Instead, a more 
appropriate avenue for the Attorney General to exercise their power is 
through rulemaking. Rulemaking, unlike case-by-case adjudication, 
does not rely on the legal analysis of a sole adjudicator but instead 
considers the input and concerns of experts in the particular field 
 
116. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
117. Family, supra note 112, at 106. 
118. Id. (citing Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assn v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
545 U.S. 967 (2005)). 
119. S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 894 F.3d 535, 555 (3d Cir. 2018). 
120. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016). In 
accordance with Brand X, the Tenth Circuit addressed the problem of an 
“executive agency, exercising delegated legislative authority, seek[ing] to 
overrule a judicial precedent interpreting a congressional statute.” Id. at 
1143 (emphasis removed). The Tenth Circuit held that executive agencies 
can overrule prior judicial precedent, but that “does not necessarily mean 
their decisions must or should presumptively apply retroactively to 
conduct completed before they take legal effect.” Id. at 1148. In his 
concurring opinion, now Supreme Court Justice Gorsuch additionally 
explained “Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to 
swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and 
concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult 
to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.” Id. at 1149 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
121. Id. at 1150. 
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through the notice and comment process.122 In the event that the 
Attorney General does use their self-referral power, Article III courts 
should not grant these improper decisions Chevron deference. 
Legal interpretation of a statute can be achieved through one of 
three methods.123 First, Congress itself could determine the meaning of 
the statute and the executive follows that meaning in deciding 
immigration cases.124 Second, if Congress leaves the statute ambiguous 
without additional guidance, it could instead give the executive branch 
the authority to use the quasi-legislative formal rulemaking process to 
make a determination.125 If a formal rulemaking requirement is not 
explicit in the statute, the executive could instead choose to implement 
informal notice and comment rulemaking to determine the statute’s 
meaning.126 Third, without further guidance from Congress, the 
executive branch could use case-by-case adjudication to interpret the 
ambiguous statute instead of notice-and-comment rulemaking.127 
For example, in Matter of A-B-, then-Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions analyzed whether “married women who are unable to leave 
their relationship” qualifies as a particular social group under the 
INA.128 What constitutes a “particular social group” is a question of 
law requiring legal interpretation.129   
Congress has left the term “particular social group” ambiguous and 
has given no further guidance.130 This leaves the executive branch to 
use either informal rulemaking or adjudication to determine its 
meaning.131 If the executive branch instigated rulemaking proceedings, 
they would conduct a public notice-and-comment period to determine 
whether “married women who are unable to leave their marriage” is the 
kind of “particular social group” that Congress had in mind when 
 
122. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 65, at 719. Rulemaking is additionally more 
neutral since it applies across-the-board as opposed to only applying in a 
particular case like adjudications. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 
1150. 
123. See Esᴋʀɪᴅɢᴇ ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 83, 716–17. 
124. See id. at 90.  
125. See id. at 716.  
126. See id. at 717. 
127. See id. at 761. 
128. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319 (A.G. 2018). 
129. See id. at 327–28. 
130. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 232–33 (B.I.A. 1985), (“Congress did 
not indicate what is understood [particular social group] to mean, nor is 
its meaning clear in the Protocol.”). 
131. See ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 716–17, 761 (discussing the 
authority of the executive branch to interpret a statute absent 
Congressional determination). 
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granting asylum.132 The result would either include or exclude that class 
of persons from the statutory language. If the executive instead elected 
to interpret “particular social group” through adjudication, immigrants 
would argue for their membership in a particular social group in 
individual cases.133 The immigration judge then decides whether the 
immigrant presented sufficient evidence of a “particular social group” 
to qualify for asylum.134 
In interpreting the phrase “particular social group,” the executive 
branch uses immigration judges to perform case-by-case adjudications 
to interpret the phrase.135 The immigration judge interprets the 
meaning of particular social group based on prior immigration cases 
and precedent.136 This decision is appealable to the BIA and then can 
be appealed to the federal courts.137  
This traditional adjudication process is reshaped when the Attorney 
General replaces the BIA’s decision with their own interpretation. In 
Matter of A-B, Sessions referred the case to himself from the BIA, at 
his own discretion.138 He then interpreted the group “married women 
who are unable to leave their relationship” and broadly concluded that, 
 
132. See id. at 717.  
133. See id. at 161. 
134. See id. at 183–84 (explaining that administrative law courts have the 
power to issue decisions with the effect of law). See also Matter of A-B-, 
27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 326–27 (A.G. 2018) (discussing the need for the 
administrative law court to interpret the decidedly ambiguous phrase of 
“particular social group”). 
135. See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 326–27. 
136. Id. at 318-20.  
137. Marouf, supra note 29. 
138. Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B-, National 
Immigrant Justice Center 7 (Jan. 2019), 
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-
type/page/documents/2019-01/Matter%20of%20A-B-
%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%201.2019%20Update%20-%20Final.pdf 
[perma.cc/9DQM-DLZT] (“A-B-’s case was initially heard and denied by 
Immigration Judge Couch at the Charlotte Immigration Court, a court 
that is notorious for its harsh attitude towards asylum seekers. Judge 
Couch has a greater than 85 percent denial rate in asylum cases. In A-B-
’s case, he made adverse findings on nearly all elements of her asylum 
claim. On appeal, the BIA reversed on all grounds, found A-B-’s claim 
similar to that of A- R-C-G-, determined she was eligible for asylum, and 
remanded the case for issuance of a decision after background checks were 
completed. On remand, Judge Couch did not follow the BIA’s order, but 
instead attempted to certify the case to the BIA, asserting that A-R-C-
G-’s viability was no longer clear. At some point thereafter, Attorney 
General Sessions learned of the decision, certified the case to himself . . . 
.”). 
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generally, no person under that category meets the definition of 
“particular social group” and therefore cannot qualify for asylum.139  
The INA sets forth a legal right for certain individuals to obtain 
asylum, subject to judicial oversight.140 It does not, however, state that 
the Attorney General may adopt rules determining when asylum should 
be granted.141 
As the head of an executive agency, the Attorney General must 
have the power to make the legislative determination of what this 
phrase means.142 The Constitution gives judicial power to the “Supreme 
Court of the United States, and to such lower Courts as Congress may 
establish.”143 Judges, acting as neutrals with no involvement in the 
political sphere, then interpret statues in the context of specific factual 
situations.144 The executive branch may exercise this judicial power 
when applying a statute to specific facts through quasi-judicial 
adjudicators.145 These adjudicators, such as immigration judges, are 
independent arbitrators subject to judicial oversight.146 If the 
immigration judge has misinterpreted the INA or otherwise incorrectly 
applied law, it is for the federal courts to review.147  
The Constitution ousts the Attorney General from exercising this 
power and ousts Congress from conferring the authority.148 When the 
Attorney General certifies a case to themself, the case-by-case 
adjudication becomes a tool for a purely executive officer to use to win 
political points from the President who appointed them.149 The 
 
139. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 340. 
140. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2019). 
141. Id.  
142. See generally ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 130–33 (discussing agency 
interpretation and execution of law). 
143. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
144. Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the 
Judiciary, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 87, 95 (1984). 
145. See ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 183–84.  
146. See id. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10. 
147. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See also ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 761–
62.  
148. ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 719 (discussing that agency decisions 
are subject to judicial review). 
149. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 847 (“‘This certification power, 
though sparingly used, is a powerful tool in that it allows the Attorney 
General to pronounce new standards for the agency and overturn 
longstanding BIA precedent.’ This authority . . . gives the Attorney 
General the ability ‘to assert control over the BIA and effect profound 
changes in legal doctrine . . . ‘”) (quoting Joseph Landau, Doma and 
Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and Enforcing Federal Law, 81 
Fᴏʀᴅʜᴀᴍ L. Rᴇᴠ. 619, 640 n. 89 (2012); Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by 
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separation of powers in the federal government, however, does not 
permit an executive official to intervene in the adjudication process and 
turn legal interpretative decisions into political decisions.150  
In Justice Powell’s concurrence in I.N.S. v. Chada, he argues that 
the House of Representatives’ use of a one-House veto is a violation of 
separation of powers.151 He found that the House’s action was “. . . 
clearly adjudicatory. The House did not enact a general rule; rather it 
made its own determination . . . [i]t thus undertook the type of decision 
that traditionally has been left to other branches.”152 Justice Powell 
argues that by simply reviewing the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service’s findings, Congress assumed a function ordinarily entrusted to 
the federal courts.153 
The same principle of separation of powers inherently applies when 
the executive intervenes in the exercise of judicial power by the 
courts.154 The executive branch can perform quasi-legislative or quasi-
judicial functions, but only through quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial 
processes respectively.155 The executive can make law through the 
quasi-legislative processes of rulemaking or adjudication.156 Unlike the 
case-by-case adjudications, rulemaking applies across the board and 
does not rely on the legal analysis of a sole adjudicator, making it an 
overall more neutral legal interpretative process.157 
When the Attorney General becomes the adjudicator, it 
additionally calls into question what deference the courts should give 
the decision.158 While courts should always consider the decision of the 
 
Fiat: The Need for Professional Safeguards in Attorney General Review 
of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1766, 1771 
(2010)). 
150. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
151. I.N.S. v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). I.N.S. v. Chada concerned a 
provision in the INA that authorized either House of Congress to 
invalidate the executive branch’s suspension of an individual’s 
deportation. Id. The House used this provision to overrule the executive’s 
suspension of Chada’s deportation. Id. 
152. Id. at 964-65. 
153. Id. 
154. See Michael C. Dorf, Can Trump Interfere with the Courts and Judges?, 
NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6, 2018, 11:49 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/can-
trump-interfere-courts-and-judges-800340 [perma.cc/9DQM-DLZT]. 
155. See ESKRIDGE ᴇᴛ ᴀʟ., supra note 65, at 716–17. 
156. See id. at 761 
157. Id. at 719. 
158. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
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lower courts, Article III courts should not necessarily afford 
immigration adjudication decisions by the Attorney General Chevron 
deference.159 The Supreme Court has held that Article III courts should 
give immigration decisions Chevron deference when the executive “gives 
ambiguous statutory terms meaning through a process of case-by-case 
adjudication.”160 The Attorney General, however, is not a formal 
adjudicator like the immigration judges and does not consistently take 
part in the case-by-case adjudications.161 Instead, the Attorney General 
steps in when they see fit and disrupts the case-by-case process the 
immigration courts use to give ambiguous statutory terms meaning.162 
Article III courts, therefore, should not give Chevron deference to the 
decisions of the head of an executive agency who improperly intervenes 
in a quasi-judicial proceeding as opposed to creating law through the 
more neutral notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
Part IV: Why The Attorney General’s Referral 
Power Is Otherwise Improper 
Even if a court would not find the Attorney General’s use of the 
referral power unconstitutional, it is still otherwise improper. The 
Attorney General’s interference threatens the immigration judge’s 
independence from political influence and inserts a non-impartial, non-
judicial actor into the case-by-case adjudication process.  
 
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). 
159. See Stephen W. Manning, Judicial Deference in Immigration Cases, 
Iᴍᴍɪɢʀᴀᴛɪᴏɴ Lᴀᴡ Gʀᴏᴜᴘ PC (2012), http://www.ilgrp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/Judicial-Deference-Article.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/843F-LCDS]. 
160. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987). 
161. See Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration Power, 
102 IOWA L. REV. 129, 130 (2017) (“ . . . this [referral power] was 
commonly used prior to 1956 to summarily affirm or deny decisions made 
by agency adjudicators in the Board of Immigration Appeals…However…it 
has been employed relatively rarely since then —albeit with greater 
regularity during the George W. Bush era than during several previous 
administrations, and the Obama presidency since.”). 
162. Id. at 143 (“[E]xercise of the referral and review mechanism has in fact 
disrupted the development of immigration law and policy. More 
specifically, many recent Attorney General decisions can be understood 
to have unsettled of judicial doctrine; suspended the long-term application 
of statute; or altered the agency’s own longstanding practices, including 
by virtue of partisan employment of the tool.”). 
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A. The Attorney General is a Political Appointee 
The referral power allows a purely executive official to take control 
of a quasi-judicial adjudication process.163 Unlike immigration judges 
and the BIA, the Attorney General is a political appointee.164 The 
Attorney General changes with each new administration and their 
actions reflect the positions of the sitting President.165 This strong 
connection to the President brings in outside political influence that 
can have negative consequences for the integrity of the immigration 
system.166 
As scholars have noted, a succeeding Attorney General can vacate 
the decision of a prior Attorney General,167 creating disunity with the 
switch of every administration.168 In 2009, then-Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey certified a case and created a procedural framework 
allowing the BIA to reopen proceedings based on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.169 His decision overruled the lower immigration 
court’s holding and prior BIA standards that held to the contrary.170 
This “midnight agency adjudication” occurred in the transition between 
President Bush’s and President Obama’s administrations.171 Such 
adjudications have been described as “attempt[s] to entrench a 
particular policy choice in anticipation of a presidential transition 
 
163. See id. at 153. 
164. Id. at 132. See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
165. See generally Organization, Mission & Functions Manual: Attorney 
General, Deputy and Associate, Dept. of 
Justice, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-
functions-manual-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/KTG8-H965] 
(discussing how the change of a president affects the Attorney General 
position). 
166. See Shah, supra note 161, at 143 (discussing how the referral and review 
mechanism causes disruption to the immigration system and interferes 
with the evolution of immigration law). 
167. See Laura S. Trice, Adjudication by Fiat: The need for Procedural 
Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals 
Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 1766, 1771 (2010) (discussing the ability of 
the Attorney General to swiftly vacate and reverse precedent). 
168. See Shah, supra note 161, at 145–46 (exemplifying how quickly the 
Attorney General can change immigration law precedent under a new 
appointment, disrupting the natural evolution of the law). 
169. See Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28. See also Shah, supra note 161, at 
145–46. 
170. See Margaret H. Taylor, Midnight Agency Adjudication: Attorney 
General Review of Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions, 102 Iᴏᴡᴀ L. 
Rᴇᴠ. 18, 23–24 (2016) (“Compean and Silva-Trevino each overturned 
settled BIA precedent . . . “).  
171. Id. 
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[g]iven the known or possibly different policy preferences of the 
incoming administration.”172 
Attorney General Mukasey’s decision was vacated that same year—
soon after the transition from President Bush to President Obama.173 
After taking office, the next Attorney General, Eric Holder, initiated 
rulemaking proceedings to give the issue proper participation from all 
interested parties.174 He then reinstated the prior standards until the 
proper changes could be made following the rulemaking process.175 The 
result was a back-and-forth in immigration policy over the course of 
just one year, disrupting the natural progression of policies through the 
case-by-case adjudication of the impartial immigration courts.176 
While the Attorney General’s decision can be appealed for judicial 
review, this rarely occurs.177 Additionally, the Attorney General’s 
review power is more expansive than those of an Article III judge 
reviewing a BIA decision.178 The Attorney General has de novo review 
of all aspects of the BIA decisions and is not confined to legal or factual 
error.179 This gives the Attorney General the freedom to produce 
additional facts and briefing and is not confined to what the agency has 
decided in the underlying proceedings.180 The result is a political 
executive appointee reviewing BIA decisions and interpreting the law 
with greater discretion, rather than leaving the decision to judicial 
review on appeal by a party to the case.181 
 
172. Id. at 24 (quoting Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching 
Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
Rᴇᴠ. 557, 599 (2003)).  
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 26. 
175. Id.; Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (AG 
2009). 
176. See Shah, supra note 161, at 143–52.  
177. Marouf, supra note 29 (“Immigrants may further appeal decisions made 
by the Board of Immigration Appeals to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the 
court one level below the Supreme Court. Very few can afford to do so. 
Of the roughly 300,000 immigration cases heard each year, only 2 percent 
are appealed to a federal judge. In 2016, 5,240 immigration appeals were 
filed with the federal appellate courts. On average, nationwide, just 8 
percent of those appeals are granted.”). 
178. KURZBAN, supra note 86, at 1556. 
179. J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 913 (AG 2006).  See also Trice, supra note 
167, at 1773 (discussing the Attorney General’s power to engage in de 
novo review, superseding immigration judges and the BIA).  
180. Gonzales & Glen, supra note 28, at 856. 
181. See Shah, supra note 161, at 153 (“ . . . the Attorney General has 
interrupted the development of immigration law by the judiciary, altered 
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The immigration judges and BIA members are in a better position 
to make immigration decisions impacting the life of so many 
immigrants.182 Experienced immigration judges are well aware of the 
laws and practice of immigration law, as they adjudicate immigration 
cases daily.183 To become one of the 21 members of the BIA,184 you must 
be appointed by the Attorney General.185 The Attorney General, on the 
other hand, is more susceptible to improperly applying immigration 
precedent.186 They are not necessarily experts in immigration law and 
instead, as chief lawyer of the federal government, oversee a wide 
variety of Department matters.187 The Attorney General is not required 
to have experience in immigration before becoming head of the 
Department of Justice.188 
While the Attorney General has staff that can advise them in the 
area of immigration,189 a political appointee such as the Attorney 
 
legislative standards, and restructured the agency’s own application of 
immigration policy, often with partisan interest in mind.”).  
182. See Trice, supra note 167, at 1773–74, 1782 (discussing the Attorney 
General’s tendency to skirt due process in immigration proceedings). 
183. See Maria Sacchetti, Immigration Judges’ Union Calls for Immigration 
Court Independent from Justice Department, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 
2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration/immigration-
judges-union-calls-for-immigration-courts-independent-from-justice-
department/2018/09/21/268e06f0-bd1b-11e8-8792-
78719177250f_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.76d3f580575d 
[https://perma.cc/6F8X-Q423]. 
184. Board of Immigration Appeals, Dᴇᴘᴛ. OF JUSTICE (Oct 15, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals 
[https://perma.cc/S56J-775B] 
185. Andrew R. Arthur, DOJ to Expand the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, (March 1, 2018) 
https://cis.org/Arthur/DOJ-Expand-Board-Immigration-Appeals 
[https://perma.cc/L55X-9EHV]. 
186. See, e.g. Practice Advisory: Applying for Asylum After Matter of A-B-, 
supra note 138, at 8 (“Compounding matters is the Attorney General’s 
chronic conflation of asylum elements throughout the decision.  By 
blending persecution with nexus, nexus with PSG, and PSG with 
persecution, the decision makes parsing the elements tricky and 
establishing asylum eligibility more daunting than the statute, 
regulations, and case law require the process to be.”). 
187. See About the Office, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/about-office [https://perma.cc/Y7JF-NLA4] 
188. See Id.  
189. See, e.g., Bido v. State, 56 A.3d 104, 109 (R.I. 2012) (“[A]nother member 
of the attorney general’s staff would have handled [the] extradition.”). 
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General is not well suited to decide immigration cases.190 Due to the 
complexity of the vast immigration laws and legal precedent, the 
Attorney General is at risk of incorrectly applying legal precedent.  
In Matter of A-B-, for example, Sessions applied a standard that 
differed from previous immigration law precedent established by 
immigration judges and the BIA.191 He held that an asylum seeker 
fleeing persecution from a non-governmental actor must show that the 
government either “condoned” the persecution or was “completely 
helpless” to stop it.192 This interpretation differs from prior 
interpretations from the BIA, as first defined in Matter of Acosta.193 
Under the Matter of Acosta standard, an asylum applicant must instead 
show that the government is “unable or unwilling” to protect them.194 
Just months after the issuance of Matter of A-B-, a federal judge 
in the District of Columbia overturned parts of A-B- in Grace v. 
Whitaker.195 This case arose from a challenge to the application of 
Matter of A-B- in the context of credible fear interviews.196 The federal 
judge held the Sessions’s holding in Matter of A-B- was arbitrary and 
capricious “because there is no legal basis for an effective categorical 
ban on domestic violence and gang-related [asylum] claims” and the 
decision constituted an unexplained change to the long-standing 
recognition of the individualized analysis required by the INA.197 The 
judge also found that Sessions’s departure from the long-standing 
“unwilling or unable” standard, as established in Matter of Acosta, was 
not a permissible construction of the persecution requirement that had 
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long been settled.198 This is not the first time a federal court has 
overturned an Attorney General’s decision or declined to follow an 
Attorney General’s interpretation of the INA.199  
The political nature of the Attorney General’s position additionally 
raises due process concerns for individuals in cases before the Attorney 
General. Procedural due process under the Constitution requires that 
every individual be given notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a 
decision by a neutral decision maker before being deprived of a 
protected interest.200 This requires impartiality on the part of those 
acting in judicial or quasi-judicial capacities, such as arbitrators.201 In 
the immigration context, courts have held that this includes impartial 
review “throughout all phases of [the] proceedings.”202 This includes 
review before an immigration judge, the BIA, or—on the rare occasion 
it occurs—before the Attorney General.203 
While the immigration judges and the BIA on their own are 
considered impartial and neutral towards each immigrant’s case, the 
position the Attorney General holds raises impartiality concerns.204 As 
a political appointee, the Attorney General maintains a strong 
affiliation with the President and the rest of their administration.205 
They act as the President’s agent to advance the administration’s 
political agenda.206 An Attorney General can change prior precedent to 
align with the new administration’s ideals by simply referring a case to 
themself and vacating the prior interpretation or holding.207 For 
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example, when Sessions vacated Matter of A-R-C-G-, he made it harder 
for foreign victims of domestic violence to obtain asylum in the United 
States—in accordance with the Trump administration’s policy of 
restricting immigration to the United States.208 To avoid political abuse, 
immigration decisions should be left to the neutral immigration judges 
and BIA to decide, rather than the politically affiliated Attorney 
General. 
B. Intrusion on the Independence of the Immigration System 
The Attorney General’s referral power also interferes with the 
independence of the immigration system.209 Under the executive branch, 
both immigration judges and administrative law judges perform quasi-
judicial functions in case-by-case adjudication.210 But the judges in the 
immigration courts are not like administrative law judges.211 
Administrative law judges are certified, appointed, and supervised by 
independent agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act, 
ensuring autonomy for the judges and limiting inference by the agency 
to control the judges.212 Immigration judges are instead appointed by 
the Attorney General to act as delegates.213 While these judges already 
lack the decisional independence guaranteed to other administrative 
judges, the ability of the Attorney General to certify a case creates an 
unnecessary layer of review.214 
Even as agents of the Attorney General, the BIA acts as an 
independent reviewer of immigration judge decisions.215 As long-term 
employees of the Department of Justice that don’t change with each 
administration, the BIA is not swayed by political considerations.216 
The BIA’s decisions are not reflections of each administration’s views 
on immigration policy, but instead are neutrally decided based on prior 
BIA precedent.217 
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Immigration judges are aware of the dangers of political influence 
in the immigration system.218 In 2018, The National Association of 
Immigration Judges called for the independence of immigration courts 
from the Justice Department.219 The Association requested that 
Congress make the immigration court an independent Article I court, 
similar to the United States Tax Court.220 The judges cited pressure 
from the Trump Administration to decide cases faster and imposing 
production quotas, which some judges argue undermines the “judicial 
independence and immigrants’ rights to a fair hearing.”221  
Unlike the routine, case-by-case analysis used by the BIA and 
immigration judges, the Attorney General selects each case as a policy-
making device,222 allowing them to leave a profound impact on the 
immigration system.223 In the majority of cases the Attorney General 
refers to themself, the result favors deportation and only a minority of 
results benefit the immigrant.224 Additionally, in only approximately 
thirty percent of cases where the Attorney General has reviewed and 
issued a written decision has the Attorney General affirmed the BIA’s 
decision.225 In all other instances, the Attorney General has either 
vacated or reversed the BIA’s decision.226  
Agency head control over their delegates is not a concept exclusive 
to the Attorney General and the immigration system.227 It is a decisive 
tool executives can use to efficiently create consistency across 
agencies.228 In the immigration context, however, as some scholars have 
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argued, these decisions are better left to the independent and 
experienced immigration judges.229 
Part V: Limiting the Attorney General’s Self-
referral Power 
The Attorney General’s referral power raises concerns regarding a 
lack of guidelines and process. Immigration judges and the BIA follow 
a process by which cases naturally progress through the immigration 
courts.230 The Attorney General, however, can overturn long-standing 
BIA precedent without the same safeguards.231 The Attorney General 
can review any case where the BIA has rendered a decision.232 The only 
other requirement placed on this authority is that the Attorney 
General’s decision must “be stated in writing and shall be transmitted 
to the BIA or secretary, as appropriate.”233 
Proponents of the self-referral power argue that the procedure 
allows the Attorney General to establish definitive interpretations of 
immigration law and efficiently implement executive branch 
immigration policy.234 While the ability of the Attorney General to 
review cases sua sponte may increase efficiency, it is easily subject to 
abuse, as seen most recently in Matter of A-B-.235  
One way to curb the Attorney General’s control over immigration 
courts is to restrict the ability of the Attorney General to refer a case 
to themself for review on their own initiative. This would allow the 
Attorney General to review a decision only when the BIA or the 
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Department of Homeland Security requests review.236 In the past, the 
BIA requested the majority of cases reviewed by the Attorney 
General.237 Presently, out of the past twenty-six decisions reviewed by 
the Attorney General, one has been referred from the BIA, fourteen 
have been self-certified by the Attorney General, and eleven have been 
referred by the Department of Homeland Security (or the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service).238 By restricting the power to 
review a case sua sponte, the Attorney General could no longer interfere 
with the natural progression of immigration cases unless called upon by 
their delegates or the Department of Homeland Security.  
Even with a restriction on the self-referral power, the Attorney 
General could still clear up inconsistencies amongst the BIA and 
immigration courts. The BIA or Department of Homeland Security may 
request certification of a case that adjudicators are struggling to uphold 
consistently.239 Because the Attorney General’s decision is binding 
throughout the immigration courts, any clarification or new standard 
the Attorney General implements creates a consistent standard for the 
immigration judges to follow.240 Any prior BIA rulings inconsistent with 
the Attorney General’s decision would then be overruled. 241  
Additionally, restricting the Attorney General’s referral power 
would not leave the executive branch without reasonable pathways to 
implement their immigration policies. The executive branch would still 
be able to implement immigration policy through executive orders or 
through the traditional rulemaking process.242 Unlike case-by-case 
adjudication, the rulemaking process applies across-the-board, as 
opposed to only applying in a particular case like adjudications.243 
Rulemaking is more neutral than adjudication as it does not rely on the 
legal analysis of a sole adjudicator but instead considers the input and 
concerns of experts in the particular field through the notice and 
comment process.244 
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Another solution to the Attorney General’s control over the 
immigration courts is to limit the Attorney General’s standard of 
review.245 While decisions by the BIA are confined to de novo review of 
questions of law and clearly erroneous review of facts, the Attorney 
General has de novo review of all aspects of the BIA decisions and is 
not confined to review of legal or factual errors.246 This gives the 
Attorney General the freedom to produce additional facts and briefing 
and is not confined to what the agency has decided in the underlying 
proceedings. 247 In this  appellate role, it would make sense for the 
Attorney General to have similar standards of review as the BIA has 
in reviewing immigration judge decisions. 
Conclusion 
In June 2018, then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions used his referral 
power to advance the Trump administration’s policy of restricting 
immigration to the United States. His decision in Matter of A-B- 
overruled a BIA decision that granted asylum to female victims of 
domestic violence.248 Using his referral power, Sessions interrupted the 
progression of immigration decisions granting asylum relief to victims 
of domestic violence.249 
The Attorney General’s referral power is a unique control of power 
over the immigration system. As a political appointee, the Attorney 
General can refer any case to themselves at their own discretion and 
overturn years of precedent.250 In doing so, the Attorney General 
interferes with the case-by-case adjudications by the immigration 
judges and the BIA. A purely executive official is then performing a 
quasi-judicial function. This ability of a political appointee to interfere 
in the independent immigration process raises constitutional and policy 
concerns. It is unwise to allow a political appointee hold such power, 
which should be limited in order to prevent further abuse. 
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